



AES and RSA Encryption Based Protocols for Cognitive Radio Network Applications

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ABSTRACT

Cognitive radio networks are intelligent networks that can sense the environment and adapt the communication parameters accordingly. These networks find their applications in co-existence of different wireless networks, interference mitigation, and dynamic spectrum access. Unlike traditional wireless networks, cognitive radio networks additionally have their own set of unique security threats and challenges, such as selfish misbehaviors, self-coexistence, license user emulation and attacks on spectrum managers; accordingly the security protocols developed for these networks must have abilities to counter these attacks. This paper presents a novel cognitive authentication protocol, called CoG-Auth, aimed to provide security in cognitive radio networks against threats to self-co-existence. CoG-Auth does not require presence of any resource enriched base stations or centralized certification authorities, thus enabling it to be applicable to both infrastructure and ad hoc cognitive radio networks. The CoG-Auth design employs key hierarchy; such as temporary keys, partial keys and session keys to fulfil the fundamental requirements of security. In this authentication we are going to implement a hybrid encryption algorithm using AES and RSA. By implementing this hybrid algorithm for CoG-Auth we are going to achieve less computational intensive, high performance, more secure and successful authentication and transmission rate.

KEYWORDS: Authentication; Cognitive Radio; Protocol; Security; Cryptography; AES; RSA

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive radio networks are becoming an increasingly important part of the wireless networking due to the scarcity of spectrum resources. Cognitive radio (CR) devices, aka secondary users - SUs, can initiate the communication using the spectrum holes spared by the licensed primary users (PUs). Sensed spectrum holes are formed into a list called free channel list (FCL), and a common control channel (CCC) is employed to exchange FCL between base station and SUs, in case of infrastructure CR networks, or among individual SUs in case of ad hoc CR networks. Compared to conventional wireless networks, CR networks additionally suffer

from licensed user emulation and attacks on spectrum managers unless robust security mechanisms are in place. One of the most common types of attacks in CR networks is the primary user emulation (PUE) attack which could affect both types of cognitive radio networks. Attacks like these and spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) can be tackled by a bio-inspired consensus-based spectrum sensing schemes. A puzzle based punishment mechanism is presented to help counter selfish behavior attacks. Selfishness is also tackled at the medium access control (MAC) layer by providing hindering detection program and correction mechanism. Trust establishment is important to ensure security

among the communicating CR nodes. Work proposed investigates trust-based security system for CR networks where CR node's trust value is analyzed according to its previous behavior in the network. A novel authentication scheme based on trust value updated model (TVUM) is presented for grouped networks to ensure authentication. SSDF attacks can also be mitigated by integration of trust and reputation. Onion Peeling approach is one, where all the CR nodes are initially considered honest, subsequently they are considered malicious when a specific threshold is overcome.

Security and authentication of CR nodes can be achieved through cryptographic techniques. An authentication protocol is presented that can be integrated with the extensible authentication protocol (EAP). For pretty good privacy (PGP), key authentication is obtained via chains of public key certificates. The protocol presented is based on clustered infrastructure based dynamic spectrum access where the spectrum decision in each cluster is coordinated by some certification authority (CA). Confidentiality and authentication across the network can also be provided by applying cryptographic transforms to the medium access control (MAC) frames. A security sub layer at the MAC level is implemented in the standards like IEEE 802.16e, and IEEE 802.22. The mentioned standards require presence of an infrastructure to perform security and other communication related activities. The protocols developed for infrastructure networks cannot be directly employed in a multi-hop ad-hoc CR network due to the absence of a trusted entity to act as a server for control and distribution of keying material. Adversaries can exploit the vulnerabilities of a multi-hop CR MAC and the communication taking place in the CCC; therefore, it is necessary to provide security in pre and post CCC transactions. It is believed that cognitive radio networks have strict security requirements at two stages; during environment sensing and during CCC transactions. A robust CCC security scheme is vital and can prevent the spread of falsified information which may result due to weak security during environment sensing. Public key Cryptography (PKC) has also been employed to implement security in CR networks. Notably, both these protocols suffer from the serious problem of man-in-the-middle attacks because of lack of confidentiality among the communicating entities, also they do not provide any integrity checking of the messages exchanged and there is no

mechanism in place to verify non-repudiation. The mentioned security protocols require the presence of a CA for the provision of the keys; it is the fundamental drawback of these protocols because, firstly, CA cannot exist for resource constrained infrastructure less ad-hoc cognitive radio networks, and secondly, CA when attacked itself becomes single point of failure.

Taking into account constraints of CR networks and the drawbacks of several of the existing protocols described above, a novel authentication protocol called Cognitive Authentication Protocol, *CoG-Auth*, is presented in this paper which is aimed to overcome spectrum access related security threats. *CoG-Auth* not only overcomes shortcomings mentioned above but additionally provides all the salient security features, such as robustness, mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation; additionally *CoG-Auth* can be applied equally to both infrastructure and ad hoc CR networks.

HYBRID ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL (COG-AUTH)

In this hybrid encryption protocol we are going to use two different cryptographic algorithms (AES & RSA). We can go in detail with each algorithm:

A) Advanced encryption Algorithm (AES):

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic data. The AES algorithm is an asymmetric block cipher that can encrypt (encipher) and decrypt (decipher) information. Encryption converts data to an unintelligible form called cipher text; decrypting the ciphertext converts the data back into its original form, called plaintext.

The AES algorithm is capable of using cryptographic keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks of 128 bits.

This standard may be used by Federal departments and agencies when an agency determines that sensitive (unclassified) information (as defined in P. L. 100-235) requires cryptographic protection.

Other FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms may be used in addition to, or in lieu of, this standard. Federal agencies or departments that use cryptographic devices for protecting classified information can use those devices for protecting sensitive (unclassified) information in lieu of this standard.

In addition, this standard may be adopted and used by non-Federal Government organizations.

Such use is encouraged when it provides the desired security for commercial and private organizations.

The algorithm specified in this standard may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof. The specific implementation may depend on several factors such as the application, the environment, the technology used, etc. The algorithm shall be used in conjunction with a FIPS approved or NIST recommended mode of operation. Object Identifiers (OIDs) and any associated parameters for AES used in these modes are available at the Computer Security Objects Register (CSOR).




Fig-1.: Basic Architecture




Fig-2.: Architectural Block Diagram

B) RSA (*cryptosystem*):

RSA is one of the first practical public-key cryptosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission. In such a cryptosystem, the encryption key is public and differs from the decryption key which is kept secret. In RSA, this asymmetry is based on the practical difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime numbers, the factoring problem. RSA is made of the initial letters of the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described the algorithm in 1977. Clifford Cocks, an English mathematician

Implementations of the algorithm that are tested by an accredited laboratory and validated will be considered as complying with this standard. Since cryptographic security depends on many factors besides the correct implementation of an encryption algorithm, Federal Government employees, and others, should also refer to NIST Special Publication 800-21, *Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government*, for additional information and guidance.

working for the UK intelligence agency GCHQ, had developed an equivalent system in 1973, but it was not declassified until 1997.

A user of RSA creates and then publishes a public key based on two large prime numbers, along with an auxiliary value. The prime numbers must be kept secret. Anyone can use the public key to encrypt a message, but with currently published methods, if the public key is large enough, only someone with knowledge of the prime numbers can feasibly decode the message. Breaking RSA encryption is known as the RSA problem; whether it is as hard as the factoring problem remains an open question.

RSA is a relatively slow algorithm, and because of this it is less commonly used to directly encrypt user data. More often, RSA passes encrypted shared keys for symmetric key cryptography which in turn can perform bulk encryption-decryption operations at much higher speed.

The idea of an asymmetric public-private key cryptosystem is attributed to Diffie and Hellman, who published the concept in 1976. The same two also introduced digital signatures and attempted to apply number theory. Their formulation used a shared secret key created from exponentiation of some number, modulo a prime number. However, they left open the problem of realizing a one-way function, possibly because the difficulty of factoring was not well studied at the time.

Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman at MIT made several attempts over the course of a year to create a one-way function that is hard to invert. Rivest and Shamir, as computer scientists, proposed many potential functions while Adleman, as a mathematician, was responsible for finding their weaknesses. They tried many approaches including "knapsack-based" and "permutation polynomials". For a time they thought it was impossible for what they wanted to achieve due to contradictory requirements. In April 1977, they spent Passover at the house of a student and drank a good deal of Manischewitz wine before returning to their home at around midnight. Rivest, unable to sleep, lay on the couch with a math textbook and started thinking about their one-way function. He spent the rest of the night formalizing his idea and had much of the paper ready by daybreak. The algorithm is now

known as RSA – the initials of their surnames in same order as their paper.

Clifford Cocks, an English mathematician working for the UK intelligence agency GCHQ, described an equivalent system in an internal document in 1973. However, given the relatively expensive computers needed to implement it at the time, it was mostly considered a curiosity and, as far as is publicly known, was never deployed. His discovery, however, was not revealed until 1997 due to its top-secret classification

The RSA algorithm involves four steps: key generation, key distribution, encryption and decryption.

RSA involves a *public key* and a *private key*. The public key can be known by everyone and is used for encrypting messages. The intention is that messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted in a reasonable amount of time using the private key.

The basic principle behind RSA is the observation that it is practical to find three very large positive integers e, d and n such that with modular exponentiation for all m :

$$(m^e)^d \bmod n = m$$

and that even knowing e and n or even m it can be extremely difficult to find d .

Additionally, for some operations it is convenient that the order of the two exponentiations can be changed and that this relation also implies:

$$(m^d)^e \bmod n = m$$

HYBRID ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL RESULTS




Fig3.: AES encryption




Fig4: AES decryption




Fig5: RSA encryption





Fig6: RSA decryption

aes_cipher_block_192



aes_cipher_block_192

Fig7: AES rtl




Fig8: AES rtl





Fig9: AES rtl

RSACypher



RSACypher

Fig10: RSA rtl

CONCLUSION

CR networks face unique security problems not encountered by conventional wireless networks. In this paper a novel authentication protocol for CR networks, *CoG-Auth*, has been proposed by taking into account the security threats and constraints of the CR devices. The protocol is implemented using RSA/AES and its performance is analysed and compared with the standard IEEE 802.16ePKMv2. It is found that *CoG-Auth* is secure and efficient enough, and gave better results for several performance indicators such as authentication time, successful authentication and transmission rate. The *CoG-Auth* also fulfils the fundamental security requirements, does not require the provision of any resource enriched base station or CAs, thus enabling it to be applicable to both Infrastructure and ad hoc CR networks.

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