

Detection of Sensitive Data Leakage in a Network using Sampling and Alignment Algorithm

S.Maheswari¹ | M.Divya Bharathi² | S.Mahalaakshmi³

^{1,2}UG Scholar, Department of CSE, E.G.S.Pillay Engineering College, Nagapattinam, India.

³Assistant Professor, Department of CSE, E.G.S.Pillay Engineering College, Nagapattinam, India.

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ABSTRACT

The leak of sensitive data on computer systems stances a serious threat to organizational security. Statistics show that the lack of proper encryption on files and communications due to human errors is one of the leading causes of data loss. Organizations need tools to identify the exposure of sensitive data by screening the content in storage and transmission, i.e., to detect sensitive information being stored or transmitted in the clear. However, detecting the exposure of sensitive information is challenging due to data transformation in the content. Transformations (such as insertion, deletion) result in highly unpredictable leak patterns. In this work, we utilize sequence alignment techniques for detecting complex data-leak patterns. Our algorithm is designed for detecting long and inexact sensitive data patterns. This detection is paired with a comparable sampling algorithm, which allows one to compare the similarity of two separately sampled sequences. Our system achieves good detection accuracy in recognizing transformed leaks.

Keywords: Data leak detection, content inspection, sampling, alignment, dynamic programming

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I. INTRODUCTION

Reports show that the number of leaked sensitive data records has grown 10 times in the last 4 years, and it reached a record high of 1.1 billion in 2014 [1]. A significant portion of the data leak incidents are due to human errors, for example, a lost or stolen laptop containing unencrypted sensitive files, or transmitting sensitive data without using end-to-end encryption such as PGP. In order to minimize the exposure of sensitive data and documents, an organization needs to prevent clear text sensitive data from appearing in the storage or communication. A screening tool can be deployed to scan computer file systems, server storage, and inspect outbound network traffic. The tool searches for the occurrences of plaintext sensitive data in the content of files or network

traffic. It alerts users and administrators of the identified data exposure vulnerabilities. Data leak detection differs from the anti-virus (AV) scanning (e.g., scanning file systems for malware signatures) or the network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) (e.g., scanning traffic payload for malicious patterns) data leak detection imposes new security requirements and algorithmic challenges: Data Transformation and Scalability. The heavy workload of data leak screening is due to two reasons. a) Long sensitive data patterns. b) Large amount of content.

Existing System

Existing network traffic sampling techniques only sample the content. Existing data leak detection approaches are based on set intersection. Set intersection is performed on two sets of n-grams, one from the content and one from sensitive

data. The set intersection gives the amount of sensitive n-grams appearing in the content. This method is used to detect similar documents on:

- ✓ Shared malicious traffic pattern.
- ✓ Malware.
- ✓ E-mail spam.

One such mechanism is platform integrity verification for compute hosts that support the virtualized cloud infrastructure. Several large cloud vendors have signaled practical implementations of this mechanism, primarily to protect the cloud infrastructure from insider threats and advanced persistent threats.

To see two major improvement vectors regarding these implementations. First, details of such proprietary solutions are not disclosed and can thus not be implemented and improved by other cloud platforms. Second, to the best of our knowledge, none of the solutions provides cloud tenants a proof regarding the integrity of compute hosts supporting their slice of the cloud infrastructure. To address this, to propose a set of protocols for trusted launch of virtual machines (VM) in IaaS, which provide tenants with a proof that the requested VM.




Fig. 1: Existing System for data leakage detection

However, set intersection is order less, i.e., the ordering of shared n-grams is not analyzed. Thus, set-based detection generates undesirable false alerts, especially when n is set to a small value to tolerant data transformation.

Proposed System

Our solution to the detection of transformed data leaks is a sequence alignment algorithm, executed on the sampled sensitive data sequence and the sampled content being inspected. The alignment produces scores indicating the amount of sensitive data contained in the content. Our alignment-based solution measures the order of n-grams. It also handles arbitrary variations of patterns without an explicit specification of all possible variation patterns. We solve the scalability issue by sampling both the sensitive data and

content sequences before aligning them. We enable this procedure by providing the pair of a comparable sampling algorithm and a sampling-oblivious alignment algorithm. This one is holding sequential alignment algorithm. Executed on :

- Sampled sensitive data sequence.
- Sampled content being inspected.
- Alignment produces the amount of sensitive data in content.
- More accuracy is achieved.

In this proposed system a “Trusted Cloud Compute Platform” (TCCP) to ensure VMs are running on a trusted hardware and software stack on a remote and initially untrusted host.

To enable this, a trusted coordinator stores the list of attested hosts that run a “trusted virtual machine monitor” which can securely run the client’s VM.

Trusted hosts maintain in memory an individual trusted key use for identification each time a client launches a VM. The paper presents a good initial set of ideas for trusted VM launch and migration, in particular the use of a trusted coordinator. A limitation of this solution is that the trusted coordinator maintains information about all hosts deployed on the IaaS platform, making it a valuable target to an adversary who attempts to expose the public IaaS provider to privacy attacks. Host, beyond the initial launch arguments

A decentralized approach to integrity attestation is adopted by Schiffman [2] to address the limited transparency of IaaS platforms and scalability limits imposed by third party integrity attestation mechanisms. The authors describe a trusted architecture where tenants verify the integrity of IaaS hosts through a trusted cloud verifier proxy placed in the cloud provider domain. Tenants evaluate the cloud verifier integrity, which in turn attests the hosts. Once the VM image has been verified by the host and countersigned by the cloud verifier, the tenant can allow the launch.

Advantages

- ✓ We describe a trusted VM launch (TL) protocol which allows tenants – referred to as domain managers – to launch VM instances exclusively on hosts with an attested platform configuration and reliably verify this.
- ✓ We describe the implementation of the proposed protocols on an open-source cloud platform.




Fig.2:Proposed system for data leakage detection

- ✓ We introduce a domain-based storage protection protocol to allow domain managers store encrypted data volumes partitioned according to administrative domains.
- ✓ We introduce a list of attacks applicable to IaaS environments and use them to develop protocols with desired security properties, perform their security analysis and prove their resistance against the attacks.
- ✓ Our solution detects inadvertent data leaks, where sensitive data may be accidentally exposed. It is not designed for detecting data leaks caused by malicious insiders or attackers.

II. RELATED WORK

Existing commercial data leak detection/prevention solutions include Symantec DLP [2], IdentityFinder [3], GlobalVelocity[4], and GoCloudDLP [5]. GlobalVelocity uses FPGA to accelerate the system. All solutions are likely based on n-gram set intersection. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) such as Snort [6] and Bro [7] use regular expression to perform string matching in deep packet inspection [7]. However, existing string matching approaches based on DFA or NFA cannot automatically match arbitrary and unpredictable pattern variations.

III. MODELS AND OVERVIEW

In our data leak detection model, we analyze two types of sequences: sensitive data sequence and content sequence.

- ✓ Content sequence is the sequence to be examined for leaks. The content may be data extracted from file systems on personal computers, workstations, and servers; or payload extracted from supervised network channels.

- ✓ Sensitive data sequence contains the information (e.g., customers' records, proprietary documents) that needs to be protected and cannot be exposed to unauthorized parties. The sensitive data sequences are known to the analysis system.

Pervasive and Localized Modification

Sensitive data could be modified before it is leaked out. The modification can occur throughout a sequence. The modification can also only affect a local region. Some modification examples:

- ✓ Character replacement.
- ✓ String insertion
- ✓ Data truncation or partial data leak.

We do not aim at detecting stealthy data leaks that an attacker encrypts the sensitive data secretly before leaking it. Preventing intentional or malicious data leak, especially encrypted leaks, requires different approaches and remains an active research problem

Technical Challenges

High detection specificity. In our data-leak detection model, high specificity refers to the ability to distinguish true leaks from positives, which may lead to false alarms.

IV. COMPARABLE SAMPLING

One great challenge in aligning sampled sequences is that the sensitive data segment can be exposed at an arbitrary position in a network traffic stream or a file system. The sampled sequence should be deterministic despite the starting and ending points of the sequence to be sampled. Moreover, the leaked sensitive data could be inexact but similar to the original string due to unpredictable transformations.

Substring

A substring is a consecutive segment of the original string. If x is a substring of y , one can find a prefix string (denoted by yp) and a suffix string (denoted by ys) of y , so that y equals to the concatenation of yp , x , and ys . yp and ys could be empty

Comparable sampling

Given a string x and another string y that x is similar to a substring of y according to a similarity measure M , a comparable sampling on x and y yields two sub sequences x_0 (the sample of x) and y_0 (the sample of y), so that x_0 is similar to a substring of y_0 according to M .

If we restrict the similarity measure M in Definition 3 to identical relation,

Example 1.

Algorithm :A subsequence-preserving sampling algorithm.

Input:n array S of items, a size jwj for a sliding window

w,aselection function f(w;N) that selects N

smallest items from a window w, i.e., f=in(w;N)

Inputs:1 1 9 4 5 7 3 5 9 7 6 6 3 3 7 1 6
1 1 9 4 5 7 3 5 8 6 6 3 7 1 6 1 4

Comparable sampling may give:

1 1 - 4 - - 3 5 - - - - 3 3 - 1 -
1 1 - 4 - - 3 - - 6 - 3 - 1 - 1 4

Random sampling may give:

1 - - 4 - - 3 5 - 7 - 6 - - 7 1 -
- 1 9 - 5 - - 5 - 6 - 3 7 - 6 1

Output: a sampled array T

The advantage of our algorithm is its context-aware selection, i.e., the selection decision of an item depends on how it compares with its surrounding items according to a selection function. As a result, the sampling algorithm is deterministic and subsequence-preserving.

Algorithm :

- 1: initialize T as an empty array of size jSj
- 2: w read(S; jwj)
- 3: let w:head and w:tail be indices in S corresponding to the higher-indexed end and lower-indexed end of w, respectively
- 4: collection mc min(w;N)
- 5: while w is within the boundary of S do
- 6: mp mc
- 7: move w toward high index by 1
- 8: mc min(w;N)
- 9: if mc 6= mp then
- 10: item en collectionDi_(mc;mp)
- 11: item eo collectionDi_(mp;mc)
- 12: if en < eo then
- 13: write value en to T at w:head's position
- 14: else
- 15: write value eo to T at w:tail's position
- 16: end if
- 17: end if
- 18: end while

We show how our sampling algorithm works in Table I. We set our sampling procedure with a sliding window of size 6 (i.e., jwj = 6) and N = 3. The input sequence is 1,5,1,9,8,5,3,2,4,8. The initial sliding window w = [1,5,1,9,8,5] and collection mc = f1,1,5g.

Sampling Algorithm Analysis

Our sampling algorithm is deterministic, i.e., given a fixed selection function f: same inputs

yield the same sampled string. However, deterministic sampling (e.g., [3]) does not necessarily imply subsequence preserving

TABLE I
Illustration Our Sampling Procedure.

S	w	Mp	Mc	En	eo	Sampled List
0	[1,5,1,9,8,5]	1,1,5	N/A	N/A	N/A	<-,-,----->
1	[5,1,9,8,5,3]	1,3,5	1,1,5	3	1	<1,-,----->
2	[1,9,8,5,3,2]	1,2,3	1,3,5	2	5	<1,-,-,-,-,-,-,2,-,->
3	[9,8,5,3,2,4]	2,3,4	1,2,3	4	1	<1,-,1,-,-,-,-,2,-,->
4	[8,5,3,2,4,8]	2,3,4	2,3,4	N/A	N/A	<1,-,1,-,-,-,-,2,-,->

V. ALIGNMENT ALGORITHM

A. Requirements and Overview

We design a specialized alignment algorithm that runs on compact sampled sequences La and Lb to infer the similarity between the original sensitive data sequence Sa and the original content sequence Sb. It needs to satisfy the requirement of sampling oblivion, i.e., the result of a sampling oblivious alignment on sampled sequences La and Lb should be consistent with the alignment result on the original Sa and Sb. Conventional alignment may underestimate the similarity between two substrings of the sampled lists, causing misalignment. Regular local alignment without the sampling oblivion property may give inaccurate alignment on sampled sequences as illustrated in Example 2.

Example 2.

Sampling-oblivious alignment vs. regular local alignment

Original lists:

5627983857432546397824366
5627983966432546395

Sampled sequences need to be aligned as:

--2---3-5---2---3-7-2-3--
--2---3-6---2---3--

However, regular local alignment may give:

23523723
23623

We develop our alignment algorithm using dynamic programming. A string alignment problem is divided into three prefix alignment sub problems: the current two items (from two sequences) are aligned with each other, or one of them is aligned with a gap.

In our algorithm, not only the sampled items are compared, but also comparison outcomes between null regions are inferred based on their non-null neighbouring values and their sizes/lengths. The comparison results include match, mismatch and gap, and they are rewarded (match) or penalized (mismatch or gap) differently for sampled items or null regions according to a weight function $fw()$. Our alignment runs on sampled out elements. We introduce:

- i) extra fields of scoring matrix cells in dynamic programming,
- ii) extra steps in recurrence relation for bookkeeping the null region information, and
- iii) a complex weight function estimating similarities between null regions.

Security Advantages of Alignment

There are three major advantages of our alignment-based method for detecting data leaks: order-aware comparison, high tolerance to pattern variations, and the capability of partial leak detection.

Algorithm 2: Recurrence relation in dynamic programming.

Input: A weight function fw , visited cells in H matrix that are adjacent to $H(i, j)$: $H(i-1, j-1)$; $H(i, j-1)$, and $H(i-1, j)$, and the i -th and j -th items L_i^a, L_j^b in two sampled sequences L^a and L^b , respectively.

Output: $H(i, j)$

1: $h^{up}.score \leftarrow fw(L_i^a, -, H(i-1, j))$

2: $h^{left}.score \leftarrow fw(-, L_j^b, H(i, j-1))$

3: $h^{dia}.score \leftarrow fw(L_i^a, L_j^b, H(i-1, j-1))$

4: $h^{up}.nullrow \leftarrow 0$

5: $h^{up}.nullcol \leftarrow 0$

6: $h^{left}.nullrow \leftarrow 0$

7: $h^{left}.nullcol \leftarrow 0$

8: $h^{dia}.nullrow \leftarrow 0$;

if $L_i^a == L_j^b$

$H(i-1, j).null_{row} + L_i^a.span + 1$,

else

9: $h^{dia}.nullcol \leftarrow 0$;

if $L_i^a == L_j^b$

$H(i, j-1).null_{col} + L_j^b.span + 1$,

else

10: $H(i, j) \leftarrow \arg_{h.score} \max \{ h^{up}, h^{left}, h^{dia} \}$

11. $H(i, j).score \leftarrow \max \{ 0, H(i, j).score \}$

Security Advantages of Alignment

There are three major advantages of our alignment-based method for detecting data leaks: order-aware comparison, high tolerance to pattern variations, and the capability of partial leak detection. All features contribute to high detection accuracy. Order-aware comparison

- ✓ High tolerance to pattern variation
- ✓ Capability of detecting partial leaks.





Fig. 3 Scoring and stream view

VI. EVALUATION ON DETECTION ACCURACY

We extensively evaluate the accuracy of our solution with several types of datasets under a multitude of real-world data leak scenarios.

TABLE III

Semantics of true and false positives and true and false negatives in our model.

Leak	True Leak	No Leak
Leak detected	TP	FP
No Leak detected	FN	TN

We implement a single-threaded prototype (referred to as AlignDLD system) and a collection intersection method (referred to as Coll-Inter system), which is a baseline. We use four datasets (Table II) in our experiments. A. Enron and B. Source-code are used either as the sensitive data or the content to be inspected. C. Outbound HTTP requests and D. MiscNet are used as the content.

Detailed usages of these datasets are specified in each experiment.

We report the detection rate in Equation (1) with respect to a certain threshold for both AlignDLD and Coll-Inter systems. The detection rate gives the percentage of leak incidents that are successfully detected. We also compute standard false positive rate defined in Equation (2). We detail the semantic meaning for primary cases, true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN), and false negative (FN), in Table III.

$$\text{Detection rate (Recall)} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{False positive rate} = \frac{FP}{FP + TP} \quad (2)$$

The detection systems intercept the outbound network traffic, perform deep packet inspection, and extract the content at the highest known network layer 4.

Then the detection systems compare the content with predefined sensitive data to search for any leak.

1) Web leak: a user publishes sensitive data on the Internet via typical publishing services, e.g., WordPress,

2) FTP: a user transfers unencrypted sensitive files to an FTP server on the Internet,

3) Backdoor: a malicious program, i.e., Glacier, on the user's machine exfiltrates sensitive data,

4) Spyware: a Firefox extension FFsniff exfiltrates sensitive information via web forms.

It is not a challenge to detect intact data leaks. Our AlignDLD system successfully detects intact leaks in all these leaking scenarios with a small sampling rate between 5% and 20%.





Fig 4. AlignDLD

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We presented a content inspection technique for detecting leaks of sensitive information in the content of files or network traffic. Our detection approach is based on aligning two sampled sequences for similarity comparison. Our experimental results suggest that our alignment method is useful for detecting multiple common data leak scenarios. The parallel versions of our prototype provide substantial speedup and indicate high scalability of our design. For future work, we plan to explore data-movement tracking approaches for data leak prevention on a host.

Future enhancement

The detection of data leaks due to malicious insiders remains a challenging open research problem.

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